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Abstract 
In this paper the question is addressed to what extent the collective processes in a 
multi-agent society can be interpreted as single agent processes. This question is 
answered by formal analysis and simulation. It is shown for an example process how it 
can be conceptualised, formalised and simulated in two different manners: from a 
single agent (or cognitive) and from a multi-agent (or social) perspective. Moreover, it 
is shown how an ontological mapping can be formally defined between the two 
formalisations, and how this mapping can be extended to a mapping of dynamic 
properties. Thus it is shown how collective behaviour can be interpreted in a formal 
manner as single agent behaviour.  
Keywords: 
Collective Intelligence, Simulation, Logical Formalisation, Single Vs. Multi-Agent 
Behaviour  
 
Introduction  
1.1 
Many processes in the world can be conceptualised using an agent metaphor. The 
result of such a conceptualisation is either a single agent (or cognitive) description or a 
multi-agent (or social) description. Especially for processes that are distributed, it is 
natural to describe them as a group of interacting agents. If a group of agents acts in a 
coherent way, however, one is often tempted to intuitively and informally interpret the 
process in singular form as a collective, and, in fact, as one individual (super)agent. 
The question addressed in this paper is whether in certain cases such an informal 
interpretation of a multi-agent system, acting in a collective manner, as an individual 
can be supported by a formal analysis. The approach to address this question is by 
formally defining an interpretation mapping between a conceptualisation of a process 
as a multi-agent system and a conceptualisation of the same process as an individual.  
1.2 
The prerequisites to undertake such a formal analysis concern formalisations of the 
notion of agent, single agent behaviour and multi-agent behaviour, and the notion of 
interpretation mapping. More specifically, what is needed is a formal notion of what 
an agent is in the sense of  
 distinctions between the agent's internal mental processes, the agent's body, 
and the agent's environment  
 interactions and relationships between mental aspects and body aspects  
 interactions and relationships between agent and environment, including 
interactions with other agents  
Furthermore, formalisations of single agent behaviour and multi-agent behaviour are 
needed that cover  
 the externally observable behaviour  
 the underlying internal processes  
Moreover, a formal notion of interpretation mapping of a single agent 
conceptualisation into a multi-agent conceptualisation is needed that  
 maps ontological concepts describing a conceptualisation of a process from an 
individual perspective to ontological concepts describing a conceptualisation 
of the same a process from a multi-agent perspective  
 covers mapping of individual mental state properties for the single agent 
conceptualisation to shared mental state properties for the multi-agent 
conceptualisation  
 covers the mapping of dynamic aspects of single agent behaviour onto those of 
multi-agent behaviour  
In this paper, for these three notions formalisations are provided and used to indeed 
achieve an approach of how a collective can be formally interpreted as an individual.  
1.3 
The formal interpretation approach is evaluated for the case of collective behaviour of 
an ant colony. The intelligence shown by ant colonies are an interesting and currently 
often studied example of collective intelligence (Bonabeau et al. 1999;Deneubourg et 
al. 1986;Drogoul et al. 1995). In this case, by using pheromones, the external world is 
exploited as a form of extended mind; cf. (Clark 1997;Clark and Chalmers 
1998;Dennett 1996;Kirsh and Maglio 1994;Menary 2006). It is shown (in Section 7) 
how this case can be seen as a paradigmatic case, also covering cases in human 
society. For example, cases in which an organization or department wants to interact 
with 'one face' with the outside world, and to this end maintains a repository for 
common guidelines. The analysis of this case study comprises on the one hand a 
multi-agent model, simulation based on identified local dynamic properties, and 
identification of dynamic properties for the overall process. On the other hand the 
same is done for an alternative model based on a single agent with internal mental 
states, and the two models are related to each other via the interpretation mapping.  
1.4 
In Section 2, a formalisation of basic agent concepts is introduced. Section 3 explains, 
using a simple example, the idea of the basic formal ontology mapping between state 
properties in a single agent conceptualisation and state properties in a multi-agent 
conceptualisation. In Section 4 this notion of basic interpretation mapping of state 
properties is applied to two conceptualisations of the more complex ant colony 
example, the central case study in the paper. Section 5 discusses the dynamics for the 
two conceptualisations of the ant colony example in more detail, which leads to formal 
specification of executable local dynamic properties that have been used for 
simulation. In Section 6 the basic interpretation mapping for state properties is 
extended to dynamic properties, thus obtaining an interpretation mapping between the 
two conceptualisations of the dynamics of the example ant colony process. In Section 
7 it is shown how the interpretation approach can be applied to other types of societies 
(e.g., human societies), where patterns occur that are similar to those in the ants case. 
Section 8 is a final discussion.  
Basic Agent Concepts  
2.1 
The agent perspective entails a distinction between the following different types of 
ontologies:  
 an ontology for internal mental properties of the agent A (MentOnt(A)),  
 for properties of the agent's (physical) body (BodyOnt(A)),  
 for properties of the (sensory or communication) input (InOnt(A))  
 for properties of the (action or communication) output (OutOnt(A)) of the 
agent, and  
 for properties of the external world (ExtOnt(A)).  
For example, the property 'the agent A feels pain' may belong to MentOnt(A), resp. 
BodyOnt(A), whereas 'it is raining' and 'the outside temperature is 7° C' may belong to 
ExtOnt(A). The agent input ontology InOnt defines state properties for received 
perception or communication, as an in-between step from environment or body state 
properties to internal mental state properties, the agent output ontology OutOnt defines 
state properties that indicate initiations of actions or communications of the agent, as 
an in-between step from internal mental state properties to environment or body state 
properties. The combination of InOnt and OutOnt is the agent interaction ontology, 
defined by InteractionOnt = InOnt ∪ OutOnt.  
2.2 
To formalise state property descriptions of the types introduced above, ontologies are 
specified in a (many-sorted) first order logical format: an ontology is specified as a 
finite set of sorts, constants within these sorts, and relations and functions over these 
sorts. The example properties mentioned above then can be defined by nullary 
predicates (or proposition symbols) such as itsraining, or by using n-ary predicates 
(with n≥1) like has_pain(A) and has_temperature(environment, 7).  
2.3 
For a given ontology Ont, the propositional language signature consisting of all state 
ground atoms based on Ont is denoted by APROP(Ont). The state properties based on 
a certain ontology Ont are formalised by the propositions that can be made, using 
(using conjunction, negation, disjunction, implication) from the ground atoms. The 
notion of state as used here is characterised on the basis of an ontology defining a set 
of physical and/or mental (state) properties that do or do not hold at a certain point in 
time. In other words, a state S is an indication of which atomic state properties are true 
and which are false, i.e., a mapping S: APROP(Ont)→ {true, false}.  
2.4 
To describe the internal and externally observable dynamics of the agent, explicit 
reference is made to time. Dynamics will be described as evolution of states over time. 
Dynamic properties can be formulated that relate a state at one point in time to a state 
at another point in time. A simple example is the following informally stated dynamic 
property for belief creation based on observation:  
'if the agent observes at t1 that it is raining, then the agent will believe that it is 
raining'. 
To express such dynamic properties, and other, more sophisticated ones, the sorted 
predicate logic Temporal Trace Language (TTL) is used (Jonker et al. 2003). Here, a 
trace over an ontology Ont is a time-indexed sequence of states over Ont. TTL is built 
on atoms referring to, e.g., traces, time and state properties. For example, 'in trace γ at 
time t property p holds' is formalised by state(γ, t) |= p. Here |= is a predicate 
symbol in the language, usually used in infix notation, which is comparable to the 
Holds-predicate in situation calculus. Dynamic properties are expressed by temporal 
statements built using the usual logical connectives and quantification (for example, 
over traces, time and state properties). For example, the dynamic property put forward 
above can be expressed in a more structured semiformal manner as:  
'in any trace γ, if at any point in time t1 the agent A observes that it is raining, 
then there exists a time point t2 after t1 such that at t2 in the trace the agent A 
believes that it is raining'.  
In formalised TTL form it looks as follows:  
∀γ ∀t1 [ state(γ, t1) |= observes(A, itsraining) ⇒ ∃t2 ≥ t1 state(γ, 
t2) |= belief(A, itsraining) ]  
2.5 
Based on TTL, a simpler temporal language has been defined to specify simulation 
models. This language (the leads to language) enables modelling direct temporal 
dependencies between two state properties in successive states. This executable format 
is defined as follows. Let α and β be state properties of the form 'conjunction of atoms 
or negations of atoms', and e, f, g, h non-negative real numbers. In the leads to 
language α → e, f, g, h β, means:  
If  
state property α holds for a certain time interval with duration g,  
then  
after some delay (between e and f) state property β will hold for a certain time 
interval of length h. 
For a precise definition of the leads to format in terms of the language TTL, see 
Jonker et al. (2003). A specification of dynamic properties in leads to format has as 
advantages that it is executable and that it can often easily be depicted graphically.  
The Basic Interpretation Mapping  
3.1 
In this section it is discussed how a conceptualisation based on a single agent and 
individual (internal) mental state properties can formally be mapped onto a 
conceptualisation based on multiple agents and shared (for the sake of simplicity 
assumed external) mental state properties. Here this ontological mapping is only given 
in its basic form, for the state properties. In Section 6 the basic mapping is extended to 
temporal expressions describing behaviour.  
3.2 
First, consider Figure 1. This figure depicts a simple case of a single agent A with 
behaviour based on an individual internal mental state property m1. The solid arrows 
depict temporal leads to relationships. Mental state property m1 (temporally) depends 
on observations of three world state properties c1, c2, c3. Moreover, action a1 
depends on m1.  
 
Figure 1. Single Agent behaviour based on an internal mental state  
3.3 
Now consider Figure 2. This figure depicts a group of agents A1, A2, A3, A4 with 
behaviour based on a physical external world state property m2 that serves as a shared 
external mental state property.  
 Figure 2. Multi-Agent behaviour based on a shared external mental state  
To create this shared mental state property, actions a2a, a2b, a2c of the agents A1, 
A2, A3 are needed, and to show the behaviour, first an observation of m2 by agent A4 
is needed. Note that here the internal processing is chosen as simple as possible: 
stimulus response. Hence, this agent is assumed not to have any internal states. This is 
in line with the ideas of Clark and Chalmers, who claim that the explanation of 
cognitive processes should be as simple as possible (Clark and Chalmers 1998). 
However, the interaction between agent and external world is a bit more complex: 
compared to a single agent perspective with internal mental state m1, extra actions of 
some of the agents needed to create the external mental state property m2, and 
additional observations are needed to observe it.  
3.4 
To make the similarity between the two different cognitive processes more precise, the 
following mapping from the nodes (state properties) in Figure 1 onto nodes in Figure 2 
can be made (see Figure 3): 
External world state properties 
φ: c1 → c1 
φ: c2 → c2 
φ: c3 → c3 
φ: effect e1 → effect e1  
Observation state properties 
φ: A observes c1 → A1 observes c1 
φ: A observes c2 → A2 observes c2 
φ: A observes c3 → A3 observes c3  
Action initiation state properties 
φ: A initiates action a1 → A4 initiates action b1  
Mental state property to external world state property 
φ: m1 → m2  
 
Figure 3. Mapping from individual mental state to shared extended mind  
Note that in this case, for simplicity it is assumed that each observation of A is an 
observation of exactly one of the Ai, and the same for actions.  
3.5 
This mapping φ, indicated by the vertical dotted arrows in Figure 3, preserves the 
temporal dependencies in the form of leads to relationships (the solid arrows) and 
provides an isomorphic embedding (in the mathematical sense) of a cognitive process 
based on internal mind into a cognitive process based on extended mind.  
3.6 
In their paper about extended mind, Clark and Chalmers (1998) point at the similarity 
between cognitive processes in the head and some processes involving the external 
world. This similarity can be used as an indication that these processes can be 
considered extended cognitive processes or extended mind:  
If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process which, 
were it done in the head, we would have no hesitation in recognizing as part of 
the cognitive process, then that part of the world is (so we claim) part of the 
cognitive process. Cognitive processes ain't (all) in the head! (…) (Clark and 
Chalmers 1998, Section 2). 
One can explain my choice of words in Scrabble, for example, as the outcome 
of an extended cognitive process involving the rearrangement of tiles on my 
tray. Of course, one could always try to explain my action in terms of internal 
processes and a long series of "inputs" and "actions", but this explanation 
would be needlessly complex. If an isomorphic process were going on in the 
head, we would feel no urge to characterize it in this cumbersome way. (…) In 
a very real sense, the re-arrangement of tiles on the tray is not part of action; it 
is part of thought. (Clark and Chalmers 1998, Section 3). 
Clark and Chalmers (1998) use the isomorphic relation to a process 'in the head' as one 
of the criteria to consider external and interaction processes as cognitive, or mind 
processes. As the shared mental state property m2 is modelled as an external state 
property, this principle is formalised in Figure 3. Note that the process from m1 to 
action a1, modelled as one step in the single agent, internal case, is mapped onto a 
process from m2 via A4 observes m2 to A4 initiates action b1, modelled as a 
two-step process in the multi-agent, external case. So the mapping is an isomorphic 
embedding in one direction, not a bidirectional isomorphism, simply because on the 
multi-agent side, the observation state for A4 observing m2 has no counterpart in the 
single agent, internal case (and the same for the agents A1, A2, A3 initiating actions 
a2a, a2b, a2c).  
3.7 
Notice that the mapping φ is a (formal) mapping between state properties. However, it 
was already put forward that temporal leads to relations are preserved under φ, so the 
mapping can be extended to a mapping of leads to properties onto leads to properties. 
From a more general perspective, it can be analysed how far the mapping φ can be 
extended to a (formal) mapping from dynamic properties to dynamic properties 
expressed in TTL. This will be addressed in detail in Section 6.  
Two Conceptualisations and their Mapping  
4.1 
The general formalisation perspective put forward in previous sections has been 
evaluated for a case study: a process of collective ant behaviour. For this example 
process, two conceptualisations have been made, one from a multi-agent (or social) 
perspective, and one for a single agent (or cognitive) perspective. In Section 7 it is 
shown how this case can be seen as a paradigmatic case for a large class of cases, 
including cases in human society (for example, where an organization or department 
wants to behave with 'one face' to the external world by maintaining common 
guidelines).  
4.2 
The world in which the ants live is described by a labeled graph as depicted in Figure 
4. Locations are indicated by A, B,…, and edges by E1, E2,… To represent such a 
graph the predicate connected_to_via(l0,l1,e1) is used. The ants move from 
location to location via edges; while passing an edge, pheromones are dropped. The 
same or other ants sense these pheromones and follow the route in the direction of the 
strongest concentration. Pheromones evaporate over time; therefore such routes can 
vary over time. The goal of the ants is to find food and bring this back to their nest. In 
this example there is only one nest (location A) and one food source (location F).  
 
Figure 4. An ant world  
Multi-Agent Conceptualisation  
4.3 
The example process conceptualised from a multi-agent perspective concerns multiple 
agents (the ants), each of which has input (to observe) and output (for moving and 
dropping pheromones) states, and a physical body which is at certain positions over 
time. However, following the claims in the previous section, they do not have any 
internal mental state properties (they are assumed to act purely by stimulus-response 
behaviour). Note that the reason for leaving out internal states is not that it is 
impossible, but simply that they are not needed for our purposes here. However, as 
will be discussed in Section 7, the interpretation approach is applicable to agents with 
internal states as well. An overview of the formalisation of the state properties of the 
multi-agent conceptualisation is shown in Table 1.  
 
Table 1: Multi-Agent conceptualisation: state properties  
 
 Multi-Agent Conceptualisation 
 body positions in world: 
pheromone level at edge e is i pheromones_at(e, i) 
ant a is at location l coming from e is_at_location_from(a, l, e) 
ant a is at edge e to l2 coming from 
location l1 
is_at_edge_from_to(a, e, l1, l2) 
ant a is carrying food is_carrying_food(a) 
 world state properties:  
edge e connects location l1 and l2 connected_to_via(l1, l2, e) 
location l has i neighbours neighbours(l, i) 
edge e is most attractive for ant a coming 
from location l 
attractive_direction_at(a, l, e) 
 input state properties: 
ant a observes that it is at location l 
coming from edge e 
observes(a, is_at_location_from(l, e)) 
ant a observes that it is at edge e to l2 
coming from location l1 
observes(a, is_at_edge_from_to(e, l1, 
l2)) 
ant a observes that edge e has pheromone 
level i 
observes(a, pheromones_at(e, i)) 
 output state properties: 
ant a initiates action to go to edge e to l2 
coming from location l1 
to_be_performed(a, go_to_edge_from_to(e, 
l1, l2)) 
ant a initiates action to go to location l 
coming from edge e 
to_be_performed(a, go_to_location_from(l, 
e)) 
ant a initiates action to drop pheromones 
at edge e coming from location l  
to_be_performed(a, 
drop_pheromones_at_edge_from(e, l)) 
ant a initiates action to pick up food to_be_performed(a, pick_up_food) 
ant a initiates action to drop food to_be_performed(a, drop_food) 
 
Single-Agent Conceptualisation  
4.4 
The conceptualisation of the example process from a single agent perspective 
(Superant S), however, takes into account one body, of which each ant is part (for 
convenience we call them the 'paws' of this body). Also the pheromone levels at the 
edges are part of the body.  
 
Table 2: Single Agent conceptualisation: state properties  
 
Single Agent Conceptualisation  
mental state properties:  
belief(S, relevance_level(e, i)) belief on the relevance level i of an 
edge e 
body position in world:  
has_paw_at_location_from(S, p, l, e) position of paw p at location l coming 
from edge e 
has_paw_at_edge_from_to(S, p, e, l1, l2) position of paw p at edge e to l2 
coming from location l1 
is_carrying_food_with_paw(S, p) paw p is carrying food 
world state properties:  
connected_to_via(l1, l2, e) edge e connects location l1 and l2 
neighbours(l, i) location l has i neighbours 
attractive_direction_at(p, l, e) edge e is most attractive for paw p 
coming from location l 
input state properties:  
observes(S, has_paw_at_location_from(p, l, 
e)) 
S observes that paw p is at location l 
coming from edge e 
observes(S, has_paw_at_edge_from_to(p, e, 
l1, l2)) 
S observes that paw p is at edge e to l2 
coming from location l1 
output state properties:  
to_be_performed(S, 
move_paw_to_edge_from_to(p, e, l1, l2)) 
S initiates action to move paw p from 
location l1 to edge e to l2 
to_be_performed(S, 
move_paw_to_location_from (p, l, e)) 
S initiates action to move paw p from 
edge e to location l 
to_be_performed(S, 
pick_up_food_with_paw(p)) 
S initiates action to pick up food with 
paw p 
to_be_performed(S, drop_food_with_paw(p)) S initiates action to drop food with 
paw p 
 
The body position of this agent in the world is defined by the collection of positions of 
each of the paws. Mental state properties for this single agent occur in the form of 
beliefs that a certain edge has a certain relevance level (realised in the body by the 
pheromone levels). Input of the single agent is defined by the collection of inputs of 
the ants at each of the paws. Output is defined by initiation of movements of one or 
more of the paws. Notice that in this case dropping pheromones is not an action, but 
an internal body process to create or update the proper beliefs by creating or updating 
their realisation in the body. An overview of the formalisation of the state properties of 
the multi-agent conceptualisation is shown in Table 2. Note that there S stands for the 
Superant.  
Mapping between Conceptualisations  
4.5 
The two conceptualisations described in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 are two 
conceptualisations of one and the same example process. A concept in any of the two 
conceptualisations in principle has a one-to-one correspondence to an aspect of this 
example process which can be considered the informal semantics of the concept (in 
our case the concept is formalised); see the double arrows in Figure 5.  
 
Figure 5. Two conceptualisations and their mapping.  
Given these one-to-one correspondences, a mapping from the single agent 
conceptualisation to the multi-agent conceptualisation can be made as follows:  
1. Take any state property c belonging to the single agent conceptualisation  
2. Identify to what aspect a of the example process this state property 
corresponds  
3. Identify to which state property d in the multi-agent conceptualisation this 
aspect a corresponds  
4. Map c to d.  
If this approach works, then a mapping is obtained that is faithful with respect to the 
example process: the state property d to which c is mapped corresponds to the same 
aspect a of the process as c, and therefore will be true (for the informal semantics) if 
and only if c is. The approach can also fail. It can fail in 2) if state properties are used 
in the single agent conceptualisation that have no counterpart in the example process. 
It can fail in 3) if in the single agent conceptualisation, aspects of the process are 
covered that are left out of consideration in the other conceptualisation. Actually, such 
aspects exist the other way around: there are aspects of the process, such as observing 
the pheromones, that are covered by the multi-agent conceptualisation, but not by the 
single agent conceptualisation. Therefore such a mapping is not possible from right to 
left in Figure 5 (see also Figure 3 in Section 3, where the mapping is not bijective 
either). However, a mapping from left to right (single agent to multi-agent 
conceptualisation), is possible. It is shown in Table 3. Note that there S stands for the 
Superant, and paw p corresponds to ant a.  
 
Table 3: Mapping between state properties  
 
Single Agent Conceptualisation Multi-Agent Conceptualisation 
belief(S, relevance_level(e, i)) pheromones_at(e, i) 
has_paw_at_location_from(S, p, l, e) is_at_location_from(a, l, e) 
has_paw_at_edge_from_to(S, p, e, l1, 
l2) 
is_at_edge_from_to(a, e, l1, l2) 
is_carrying_food_with_paw(S, p) is_carrying_food(a) 
connected_to_via(l1, l2, e) connected_to_via(l1, l2, e) 
neighbours(l, I) neighbours(l, i) 
attractive_direction_at(p, l, e) attractive_direction_at(a, l, e) 
observes(S, 
has_paw_at_location_from(p, l, e)) 
observes(a, is_at_location_from(l, 
e)) 
observes(S, 
has_paw_at_edge_from_to(p, e, l1, 
l2)) 
observes(a, is_at_edge_from_to(e, l1, 
l2)) 
--- observes(a, pheromones_at(e, i)) 
to_be_performed(S, 
move_paw_to_edge_from_to(p, e, l1, 
l2)) 
to_be_performed(a, 
go_to_edge_from_to(e, l1, l2)) 
to_be_performed(S, 
move_paw_to_location_from (p, l, e)) 
to_be_performed(a, 
go_to_location_from(l, e)) 
--- to_be_performed(a, 
drop_pheromones_at_edge_from(e, l)) 
to_be_performed(S, 
pick_up_food_with_paw(p)) 
to_be_performed(a, pick_up_food) 
to_be_performed(S, 
drop_food_with_paw(p)) 
to_be_performed(a, drop_food) 
 
Two Simulation Models  
5.1 
The two conceptualisations introduced above have been used to create two simulation 
models for collective ant behaviour: one from a multi-agent (social) perspective and 
one from a single agent (cognitive) perspective. The basic building blocks of the 
model were dynamic properties in leads to format, specifying the local mechanisms of 
the process. Examples of such local dynamic properties (for the multi-agent case) are 
the following:  
LP5 (Selection of Edge)  
"If an ant observes that it is at location l, and there are three edges connected to that 
location, then the ant goes to the edge with the highest amount of pheromones."  
Formalisation: observes(a, is_at_location_from(l, e0)) and neighbours(l, 
3) and connected_to_via(l, l1, e1) and observes(a, pheromones_at(e1, 
i1)) and connected_to_via(l, l2, e2) and observes(a, 
pheromones_at(e2, i2)) and e0 ≠ e1 and e0 ≠ e2 and e1 ≠ e2 and i1 > 
i2 → to_be_performed(a, go_to_edge_from_to(e1, l1))  
LP6 (Arrival at Edge)  
"If an ant goes to edge e from location l to location l1, then later the ant will be at this 
edge e."  
to_be_performed(a, go_to_edge_from_to(e, l, l1)) → 
is_at_edge_from_to(a, e, l, l1)  
LP9 (Dropping of Pheromones)  
"If an ant observes that it is at an edge e from a location l to a location l1, then it will 
drop pheromones at this edge e."  
observes(a, is_at_edge_from_to(e, l, l1)) → to_be_performed(a, 
drop_pheromones_at_edge_from(e, l))  
LP12 (Observation of Pheromones)  
"If an ant is at a certain location l, then it will observe the number of pheromones 
present at all edges that are connected to location l."  
is_at_location_from(a, l, e0) and connected_to_via(l, l1, e1) and 
pheromones_at(e1, i) → observes(a, pheromones_at(e1, i))  
LP13 (Increment of Pheromones)  
"If an ant drops pheromones at edge e, and no other ants drop pheromones at this edge, 
then the new number of pheromones at e becomes i*decay+incr." Here, i is the old 
number of pheromones, decay is the decay factor, and incr is the amount of 
pheromones dropped.  
to_be_performed(a1, drop_pheromones_at_edge_from(e, l1)) and ∀l2 not 
to_be_performed(a2, drop_pheromones_at_edge_from(e, l2)) and ∀l3 not 
to_be_performed(a3, drop_pheromones_at_edge_from(e, l3)) and a1 ≠ a2 
and a1 ≠ a3 and a2 ≠ a3 and pheromones_at(e, i) → pheromones_at(e, 
i*decay+incr)  
LP14 (Collecting of Food)  
"If an ant observes that it is at location F (the food source), then it will pick up some 
food."  
observes(a, is_at_location_from(F, e)) → to_be_performed(a, 
pick_up_food)  
5.2 
To model the example from a single agent perspective, again a number of local 
dynamic properties are used. Most, but not all of these local properties have a 1:1 
correspondence to those for the multi-agent case. For example, the properties for the 
single agent case that correspond to the properties above are as follows (see the next 
section for more information about this correspondence):  
LP5' (Selection of Edge)  
"If S observes that it has a paw p at location A, and there are three edges connected to 
that location, then S will move its paw to the edge of which it believes that it has the 
highest relevance level." 
observes(S, has_paw_at_location_from(p, l, e0)) and neighbours(l, 3) 
and connected_to_via(l, l1, e1) and belief(S, relevance_level(e1, 
i1)) and connected_to_via(l, l2, e2) and belief(S, 
relevance_level(e2, i2)) and e0 ≠ e1 and e0 ≠ e2 and e1 ≠ e2 and i1 > 
i2 → to_be_performed(S, move_paw_to_edge_from_to(p, e1, l1))  
LP6' (Paw Arrival at Edge)  
"If S moves its paw p to an edge e from a location l to a location l1, then later this paw 
will be at this edge e."  
to_be_performed(S, move_paw_to_edge_from_to(p, e, l, l1)) → 
has_paw_at_edge_from_to(S, p, e, l, l1)  
LP11' (Increment of Belief)  
"If S has exactly one paw at edge e, then the new number of pheromones at e becomes 
i*decay+incr."  
observes(S, has_paw_at_edge_from_to(p1, e, l, l1)) and ∀l2 not 
observes(S, has_paw_at_edge_from_to(p2, e, l, l2)) and ∀l3 not 
observes(S, has_paw_at_edge_from_to(p3, e, l, l3)) and p1 ≠ p2 and p1 
≠ p3 and p2 ≠ p3 and belief(S, relevance_level(e, i)) → belief(S, 
relevance_level(e, i*decay+incr))  
LP12' (Collecting of Food)  
"If S observes that it has a paw p at location F (the food source), then it will pick up 
some food with that paw."  
observes(S, has_paw_at_location_from(p, F, e)) → to_be_performed(S, 
pick_up_food_with_paw(p))  
The complete sets of local properties used to model the example are shown in 
Appendix A (multi-agent case) and Appendix B (single agent case).  
5.3 
In Bosse et al. (2005), a special software environment is introduced for the simulation 
of executable models. Based on an input consisting of dynamic properties in leads to 
format, it can generate simulation traces. This environment has been used to generate a 
number of simulation traces for the ants case study. An example of (part of) such a 
trace can be seen in Figure 6. To facilitate understanding, in this simulation only three 
ants are involved. Moreover, only some of the relevant state properties are shown (in 
particular, those dealing with the movement of ant1, and with the food delivery of the 
ants). Time is on the horizontal axis, the state properties are on the vertical axis. A 
dark box on top of the line indicates that the property is true during that time period, 
and a lighter box below the line indicates that the property is false. This trace was 
based on the multi-agent simulation model.  
 Figure 6. Multi-Agent Simulation Trace  
5.4 
Figure 7 depicts a similar trace as Figure 6, this time based on the single agent 
simulation model. Note that there are several differences between Figure 6 and 7. In 
the first place, all ants that are treated as separate agents in Figure 6, are considered as 
parts of Superant S in Figure 7. For example, is_at_location_from(ant1, A, 
E6)) in the multi-agent case corresponds to has_paw_at_location_from(S, paw1, 
A, E6)) in the single agent case. Another important difference is that in the single 
agent case, there is no explicit observation of pheromones. The reason for this is that 
the belief(S, relevance_level(e, i)) states (which are the single agent 
equivalent for the pheromones_at(e, i) states in the multi-agent case) are internal 
states of S, which do not have to be observed.  
5.5 
Altogether, the software environment has been used to successfully generate a large 
number of simulation traces on the basis of both simulation models. As mentioned 
earlier, in the examples depicted only three ants are involved. However, similar 
experiments have been performed with populations of 50 and 100 ants. Since the 
abstract way of modelling used for the simulation is not computationally expensive, 
also these simulations can be performed relatively quickly. To be precise, they took 35 
seconds (for 50 ants and 80 time steps), 70 seconds (100 ants, 80 time steps), 100 
seconds (50 ants, 200 time steps), and 200 seconds (100 ants, 200 time steps), 
respectively. A number of these simulation traces are stored in: 
http://www.cs.vu.nl/~tbosse/isomorphism/.  
 
Figure 7. Single Agent Simulation Trace  
The Extended Interpretation Mapping  
6.1 
In Section 3 it was shown how the basic interpretation mapping can be defined as a 
mapping between state properties. It was suggested that this mapping can be extended 
to a mapping between local dynamic properties in leads to format. Therefore, the 
following interpretation mapping can be defined:  
φ(α → β) = φ(α) → φ(β) 
Using this interpretation mapping, combined with the basic mapping of the state 
ontology elements described in Section 4, mappings between the dynamic properties 
of the case study can be found, e.g.:  
φ(LP6') =  
φ(to_be_performed(S, move_paw_to_edge_from_to(p, e, l, l1)) → 
has_paw_at_edge_from_to(S, p, e, l, l1)) =  
φ(to_be_performed(S, move_paw_to_edge_from_to(p, e, l, l1))) → 
φ(has_paw_at_edge_from_to(S, p, e, l, l1)) =  
to_be_performed(a, go_to_edge_from_to(e, l, l1)) → is_ 
at_edge_from_to(a, e, l, l1)) =  
LP6  
A mapping between all local dynamic properties (in leads to format) of the case study 
is given in Table 4. Notice that in some cases a certain dynamic property is mapped to 
a dynamic property that is not literally in the multi-agent model, but actually is a 
combination of two other local properties present in the model. This shows where the 
single agent conceptualisation is simpler than the multi-agent conceptualisation.  
 
Table 4: Mapping between local dynamic properties  
 
Single Agent Conceptualisation Multi-Agent Conceptualisation 
LP1' LP1 
LP2' LP2 
LP3' LP3 
LP4' LP4 
LP5' LP5 & LP12 
LP6' LP6 
LP7' LP7 
LP8' LP8 
LP9' LP10 
LP10' LP11 
LP11' LP9 & LP13 
LP12' LP14 
LP13' LP15 
LP14' LP16 
LP15' LP17 
LP16' LP9 & LP18 
 
The mapping shown in Table 4 is a syntactic mapping. However, also the traces 
generated on the basis of these properties can be mapped: each trace γ can be mapped 
onto a trace φ(γ) = γ'. For example, the trace depicted in Figure 7 can be mapped onto 
the trace depicted in Figure 6. This shows that the syntactic mapping between local 
properties preserves semantics.  
6.2 
In addition, it is possible to extend the mapping to the wider class of TTL expressions. 
Recall that TTL expressions are built on atoms of the form state(γ, t) |= p. By 
the basic mapping the state property p can be translated into φ(p), which is assumed to 
be part of the ontology of one of the agents Ai in the multi-agent conceptualisation. 
Moreover, the trace name γ can be mapped onto a trace name φ(γ) = γ'. Then the 
extended interpretation mapping for state(γ, t) |= p is defined by:  
φ: state(γ, t) |= p = state(γ', t) |= φ(p) 
After these atoms have been mapped, TTL expressions as a whole can be mapped in a 
straightforward compositional manner:  
φ(A & B) = φ(A) & φ(B) 
φ(A ⇒ B) = φ(A) ⇒ φ(B)  
φ(not A) = not φ(A)  
φ(∀v A(v)) = ∀v' φ(A(v'))  
φ(∃v A(v)) = ∃v' φ(A(v'))  
For example, take the following TTL expression, which is a global property for the 
single agent case of the ant example:  
GP1' Food Discovery  
"Eventually, one of the paws of S will be at the food location." 
∃t,p,l,e [ state(γ, t) |= has_paw_at_location_from(S, p, l, e) & 
state(γ, t) |= food_location(l) ]  
This expression is mapped as follows:  
φ(∃t,p,l,e [ state(γ, t) |= has_paw_at_location_from(S, p, l, e) & 
state(γ, t) |= food_location(l) ]) 
= ∃t',p',l',e' φ([ state(γ, t') |= has_paw_at_location_from(S, p', 
l', e') & state(γ, t') |= food_location(l') ]) 
= ∃t',p',l',e' [φ(state(γ, t') |= has_paw_at_location_from(S, p', l', 
e')) & φ(state(γ, t') |= food_location(l')) ]  
= ∃t',p',l',e' [ state(γ', t') |= φ(has_paw_at_location_from(S, p', 
l', e')) & state(γ', t') |= φ(food_location(l')) ]  
= ∃t',p',l',e' [ state(γ', t') |= is_at_location_from(p', l', e') & 
state(γ', t') |= food_location(l') ]  
Thus, eventually global property GP1' is mapped to the following global property 
(GP1):  
GP1 Food Discovery  
"Eventually, one of the ants will be at the food location." 
∃t,a,l,e [ state(γ, t) |= is_at_location_from(a, l, e) & state(γ, t) 
|= food_location(l) ]  
Implications for Other Types of Society  
7.1 
In the previous sections, the notion of a mapping between a multi-agent and single 
agent conceptualisation of processes in the world has been illustrated for an example 
ant society. In this section, it will be shown that this example is in fact paradigmatic 
for a whole class of examples, including examples from human society. The general 
idea is as follows. Suppose certain processes are modelled as a multi-agent process, 
where all agents interact with a given part of the world by observing it and making 
changes in it. At any point in time, the state of this part of the world is the result of 
contributions of multiple agents. Moreover, this state affects the behaviour of the 
agents: their behaviour depends on this part of the world. So, at an abstract level this 
describes what happens in the ant society case. Examples of this beyond ant societies 
are:  
 the blackboard in a blackboard system,  
 the collection of past cases that can be considered for jurisprudence by 
lawyers,  
 a common database in an organisation that is used to maintain and retrieve 
common client information,  
 a common knowledge repository in the context of knowledge management  
 a common guidelines document for a certain department.  
 a common automated advice system for a certain department  
7.2 
Let us elaborate a bit on the last examples by discussing a case we encountered a few 
years ago within a banking organisation. A given department is responsible for 
advising clients for certain products P, depending on the background context C of the 
client. The management of the department notices that an advice is often depending on 
the specific advisor, and considers this as less desirable. It wants to put an effort to 
show as a department more 'one face' to the outside world of clients. The management 
considers the possibility to automate the tasks by means of a decision support system 
that for each context more or less forces advisors to one solution. Now, in the context 
of the current paper, assume that in such a situation all pieces of advice given by all 
employees within the department are stored in a case database DB, in the form of 
tuples  
< C, P, E, t >  
with C a context representation, P the advised product for that context, E the employee 
giving this advice and t the time when the advice was given. The daily practice then 
should be as follows. For any employee, having a client with context C, the employee 
inspects the database and retrieves all previous cases for the same context:  
CASES(C) = { < P, E, t > | < C, P, E, t > ∈ DB } 
If this set is empty, the employee just gives her own advice and adds this to the 
database. When this set is not empty, on the basis of this set it is determined what 
advice should be given. This can be done in a number of ways:  
 take the advice P that has most frequently been given in the past: for context C 
take P such that  
max { #{ < P', t > | ∃E < P', E, t > ∈ CASES(C) } | P' product } =  
#{ < P, t > | ∃E < P, E, t > ∈ CASES(C) } 
 take the advice P that has most votes of employees to be used by them: for 
context C take P such that 
max { #{ E | ∃t < P', E, t > ∈ CASES(C) } | P' product } =  
#{ E | ∃t < P, E, t > ∈ CASES(C) } 
 take the advice P that has most frequently been given in the past, but apply 
weight factors according to a decay rate that values a more recent advice 
higher than an earlier advice: for context C and for the current time point t, 
take P such that 
max { &Sigmat' r
t-t' #{ < P', t' > | ∃E < P', E, t' > ∈ CASES(C) } | P' 
product } =  
& Sigmat' r
t-t' #{ < P, t' > | ∃E < P, E, t' > ∈ CASES(C) } 
 
Notice that this last approach is, even in structure, quite similar to the ants case. The 
edges correspond to the pairs < C, P >, and crossing an edge corresponds to giving 
such an advice. But also for the other approaches considered the similarity exists. By 
accumulating the past actions of the multiple agents, a structure is created so that the 
multi-agent system behaves more with one face to the external world of clients. 
Therefore, the clients can more easily consider the department as one single agent. The 
formal interpretation mapping as described in this paper formalises this situation.  
Discussion  
8.1 
This paper addresses the question to what extent a process involving multiple agents 
that shows some form of collective intelligence can be interpreted as single agent 
behaviour. The question is answered by formal analysis. It is shown for an example 
process how it can be conceptualised and formalised in two different manners: from a 
single agent (or cognitive) and from a multi-agent (or social) perspective. Moreover, it 
is shown how a basic ontological mapping can be formally defined between the two 
formalisations, and how this mapping can be extended to a mapping of dynamic 
properties. Thus it is shown how the collective behaviour can be interpreted in a 
formal manner as single agent behaviour. For example, the fact that food is taken from 
the source to the nest can be explained by a sequence of actions of one agent, based on 
its beliefs. Although the case study addressed the simple example of an ant colony, it 
was shown that the presented interpretation approach can be applied to human 
societies as well. For example, the various processes going on within the department 
of an organisation can be explained as the behaviour of a single agent.  
8.2 
Having a mapping as described above allows one to explain collective or social 
behaviour in terms of single agent concepts, in the following manner. Behaviour often 
is explained by considering the basic underlying causal relations or mechanisms. The 
mapping (and its formalisation) allows one to replace an explanation of behaviour in 
terms of basic mechanisms involving frequent interactions of the multiple agents (with 
each other and/or with the external world), by an explanation that leaves out these 
interactions and bases itself directly on mental states of the single agent 
conceptualisation. This explanation is often simpler, more abstract, better 
understandable, and perhaps more elegant than the more complicated explanation 
based on the interactions. This is made possible by introducing a new ontology for 
states involved. For example, considering part of the external world as extended mind 
allows one to give another interpretation to external physical processes and states. 
Physical state properties such as 'pheromone is present at d' are reconceptualised as, 
for example, 'it is believed that d is a relevant path'. Likewise, for the banking 
example, state properties such as 'advice P has received the highest number of votes' 
can be reconceptualised as 'it is believed that P is an appropriate advice'.  
8.3 
Why would one introduce extra language to refer to the same fact in the world? Given 
the literature on reduction, where often it is claimed that mental state properties can be 
and actually should be replaced by their physical realisers, at first sight such an 
opposite move may seem a bit surprising. For example, Kim (1996, pp. 214-216) 
claims that ontological simplification is one of the reasons to reduce mental state 
properties to physical state properties. In the extended mind case at hand, the converse 
takes place; a question is what is the advantage of this ontological complication. A 
number of arguments in support of this can be given. Clark and Chalmers (1998) claim 
that this allows application of other types of explanation and other methods of 
scientific investigation:  
(…) we allow a more natural explanation of all sorts of actions. (…) in seeing 
cognition as extended one is not merely making a terminological decision; it 
makes a significant difference to the methodology of scientific investigation. In 
effect, explanatory methods that might once have been thought appropriate 
only for the analysis of "inner" processes are now being adapted for the study 
of the outer, and there is promise that our understanding of cognition will 
become richer for it. (Clark and Chalmers 1998, Section 3). 
In Jonker et al. (2002) it is explained in some detail why in various cases in other areas 
(such as Computer Science) such an antireductionist strategy often pays off; some of 
the discussed advantages in terms of insight, transparency and genericity are: 
additional higher-level ontologies can improve understanding as they may allow 
simplification of the picture by abstracting from lower-level details; more insight is 
gained from a conceptually higher-level perspective; analysis of more complex 
processes is possible; finally, the same concepts have a wider scope of application, 
thus obtaining unification.  
8.4 
Also it is claimed by Dennett that the use of a different ontology for the same world 
facts can be beneficial. In Dennett (1991b), he puts forward the intentional stance, a 
perspective that allows one to describe certain physical phenomena in terms of mental 
concepts such as desires and intentions, in order to obtain more understandable 
explanations:  
Predicting that someone will duck if you throw a brick at him is easy from the 
folk-psychological stance; it is and will always be intractable if you have to 
trace the protons from brick to eyeball, the neurotransmitters from optic nerve 
to motor nerve, and so forth. (Dennett 1991b), p. 42. 
In this context, the perspective taken in the current paper can be viewed as an 
extension of the intentional stance, where mental concepts are ascribed not only to 
single agents, but also to processes that can be conceptualised as groups of agents. A 
difference with Dennett (1991b) is that the only types of mental states addressed in the 
current paper are beliefs. Nevertheless, we expect that our approach can be extended 
in order to ascribe other mental states (such as desires and intentions) to multi-agent 
societies as well. Further research will have to confirm this.  
8.5 
Given the perspective of the intentional stance, the question might come up whether 
the behavioural description of the resulting 'super-agent' will not become just as 
complex as that of the initial multi-agent system. Two answers may be given to this 
question. First, the ants case study addressed in this paper has shown that there are at 
least a number of concepts in the multi-agent description that can be left out in the 
single agent description. In particular, such concepts are the creation and the 
observation of the 'shared extended mental state' (state m2 in Figure 3); also see Table 
3 where for some concepts in the right column there is no counterpart in the left 
column. Moreover, even if the single agent description is still rather complex, this 
does not have to be a problem. Within cognitive science, many approaches exist to 
handle complexity of an agent's mental processes by imposing structure on it (see, 
e.g.,Fodor 1983). In this view, the collective behaviour of a group of agents may be 
seen as single agent behaviour that consists of a number of sub-processes.  
8.6 
In Section 4.3, it was mentioned that the mapping from multi-agent to single agent 
conceptualisation is unidirectional, not bidirectional. The main reason for this was that 
a number of the 'collective' concepts did not have an 'individual' counterpart. 
However, in the literature on philosophy of mind, several authors show that in some 
cases it might also be beneficial to explain an individual mental process as a collective 
process (see e.g.Dennett 1991a). Thus, it might be useful to explore more possibilities 
to obtain a mapping in the opposite direction. In future work, these possibilities will be 
investigated in more detail.  
8.7 
Other future research will further analyse the interpretation mapping in the context of 
logic: the notion of an interpretation of one (formal) logical theory T in another logical 
theory T' has a formal definition in logic. It is an interesting question whether it can be 
proven logically that the conditions of this definition are fulfilled for the mapping 
defined in this paper. For example, a question is whether it can be proven that:  
T |-- α ⇒ T' |-- φ(α)  
for all formulae α, where T is a logical theory of single agent behaviour and T' a 
theory of multi-agent behaviour. More specifically, suppose that a global property B is 
implied by a number of local properties A1, …, An, according to the following 
relation:  
A1 & … & An ⇒ B  
Given this implication, the question to explore would be whether there is a similar 
relation available between the mapped properties, i.e., whether the following 
implication:  
φ(A1) & … & φ(An) ⇒ φ(B)  
holds as well.  
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Appendix A - The Multi-Agent Simulation Model  
LP1 (Initialisation of Pheromones)  
"At the start of the simulation, at all locations there are 0 pheromones." 
start → pheromones_at(E1, 0.0) and pheromones_at(E2, 0.0) and 
pheromones_at(E3, 0.0) and pheromones_at(E4, 0.0) and 
pheromones_at(E5, 0.0) and pheromones_at(E6, 0.0) and 
pheromones_at(E7, 0.0) and pheromones_at(E8, 0.0) and 
pheromones_at(E9, 0.0) and pheromones_at(E10, 0.0)  
LP2 (Initialisation of Ants)  
"At the start of the simulation, all ants are at location A."  
start → is_at_location_from(ant1, A, init) and 
is_at_location_from(ant2, A, init) and is_at_location_from(ant3, A, 
init)  
LP3 (Initialisation of World)  
"These two properties model the ant world. The first property expresses which 
locations are connected to each other, and via which edges they are connected. The 
second property expresses for each location how many neighbours it has."  
start → connected_to_via(A, B, l1) and … and connected_to_via(D, H, 
l10) start → neighbours(A, 2) and … and neighbours(H, 3)  
LP4 (Initialisation of Attractive Directions)  
"This property expresses for each ant and each location, which edge is most attractive 
for the ant at if it arrives at that location. This criterion can be used in case an ant 
arrives at a location where there are two edges with an equal amount of pheromones."  
start → attractive_direction_at(ant1, A, E1) and … and 
attractive_direction_at(ant3, E, E5)  
LP5 (Selection of Edge)  
"These properties model the edge selection mechanism of the ants. For example, the 
first property expresses that, when an ant observes that it is at location A, and both 
edges connected to location A have the same number of pheromones, then the ant goes 
to its attractive direction."  
observes(a, is_at_location_from(A, e0)) and 
attractive_direction_at(a, A, e1) and connected_to_via(A, l1, e1) and 
observes(a, pheromones_at(e1, i1)) and connected_to_via(A, l2, e2) 
and observes(a, pheromones_at(e2, i2)) and e1 ≠ e2 and i1 = i2 → 
to_be_performed(a, go_to_edge_from_to(e1, A, l1))  
observes(a, is_at_location_from(A, e0)) and connected_to_via(A, l1, 
e1) and observes(a, pheromones_at(e1, i1)) and connected_to_via(A, 
l2, e2) and observes(a, pheromones_at(e2, i2)) and i1 > i2 → 
to_be_performed(a, go_to_edge_from_to(e1, A, l1))  
observes(a, is_at_location_from(F, e0)) and connected_to_via(F, l1, 
e1) and observes(a, pheromones_at(e1, i1)) and connected_to_via(F, 
l2, e2) and observes(a, pheromones_at(e2, i2)) and i1 > i2 → 
to_be_performed(a, go_to_edge_from_to(e1, F, l1))  
observes(a, is_at_location_from(l, e0)) and neighbours(l, 2) and 
connected_to_via(l, l1, e1) and e0 ≠ e1 and l ≠ A and l ≠ F → 
to_be_performed(a, go_to_edge_from_to(e1, l, l1))  
observes(a, is_at_location_from(l, e0)) and 
attractive_direction_at(a, l, e1) and neighbours(l, 3) and 
connected_to_via(l, l1, e1) and observes(a, pheromones_at(e1, 0.0)) 
and connected_to_via(l, l2, e2) and observes(a, pheromones_at(e2, 
0.0)) and e0 ≠ e1 and e0 ≠ e2 and e1 ≠ e2 → to_be_performed(a, 
go_to_edge_from_to(e1, l, l1))  
observes(a, is_at_location_from(l, e0)) and neighbours(l, 3) and 
connected_to_via(l, l1, e1) and observes(a, pheromones_at(e1, i1)) 
and connected_to_via(l, l2, e2) and observes(a, pheromones_at(e2, 
i2)) and e0 ≠ e1 and e0 ≠ e2 and e1 ≠ e2 and i1 > i2 → 
to_be_performed(a, go_to_edge_from_to(e1, l1))  
LP6 (Arrival at Edge)  
"If an ant goes to an edge e from a location l to a location l1, then later the ant will be 
at this edge e."  
to_be_performed(a, go_to_edge_from_to(e, l, l1)) → 
is_at_edge_from_to(a, e, l, l1)  
LP7 (Observation of Edge)  
"If an ant is at a certain edge e, going from a location l to a location l1, then it will 
observe this."  
is_at_edge_from_to(a, e, l, l1) → observes(a, is_at_edge_from_to(e, 
l, l1))  
LP8 (Movement to Location)  
"If an ant observes that it is at an edge e from a location l to a location l1, then it will 
go to location l1."  
observes(a, is_at_edge_from_to(e, l, l1)) → to_be_performed(a, 
go_to_location_from(l1, e))  
LP9 (Dropping of Pheromones)  
"If an ant observes that it is at an edge e from a location l to a location l1, then it will 
drop pheromones at this edge e."  
observes(a, is_at_edge_from_to(e, l, l1)) → to_be_performed(a, 
drop_pheromones_at_edge_from(e, l))  
LP10 (Arrival at Location)  
"If an ant goes to a location l from an edge e, then later it will be at this location l."  
to_be_performed(a, go_to_location_from(l, e)) → 
is_at_location_from(a, l, e)  
LP11 (Observation of Location)  
"If an ant is at a certain location l, then it will observe this."  
is_at_location_from(a, l, e) → observes(a, is_at_location_from(l, e))  
LP12 (Observation of Pheromones)  
"If an ant is at a certain location l, then it will observe the number of pheromones 
present at all edges that are connected to location l."  
is_at_location_from(a, l, e0) and connected_to_via(l, l1, e1) and 
pheromones_at(e1, i) → observes(a, pheromones_at(e1, i))  
LP13 (Increment of Pheromones)  
"These properties model the increment of the number of pheromones at an edge as a 
result of ants dropping pheromones. For example, the first property expresses that, if 
an ant drops pheromones at edge e, and no other ants drop pheromones at this edge, 
then the new number of pheromones at e becomes i*decay+incr. Here, i is the old 
number of pheromones, decay is the decay factor, and incr is the amount of 
pheromones dropped."  
to_be_performed(a1, drop_pheromones_at_edge_from(e, l1)) and ∀l2 not 
to_be_performed(a2, drop_pheromones_at_edge_from(e, l2)) and ∀l3 not 
to_be_performed(a3, drop_pheromones_at_edge_from(e, l3)) and a1 ≠ a2 
and a1 ≠ a3 and a2 ≠ a3 and pheromones_at(e, i) → pheromones_at(e, 
i*decay+incr)  
to_be_performed(a1, drop_pheromones_at_edge_from(e, l1)) and 
to_be_performed(a2, drop_pheromones_at_edge_from(e, l2)) and ∀l3 not 
to_be_performed(a3, drop_pheromones_at_edge_from(e, l3)) and a1 ≠ a2 
and a1 ≠ a3 and a2 ≠ a3 and pheromones_at(e, i) → pheromones_at(e, 
i*decay+incr+incr)  
to_be_performed(a1, drop_pheromones_at_edge_from(e, l1)) and 
to_be_performed(a2, drop_pheromones_at_edge_from(e, l2)) and 
to_be_performed(a3, drop_pheromones_at_edge_from(e, l3)) and a1 ≠ a2 
and a1 ≠ a3 and a2 ≠ a3 and pheromones_at(e, i) → pheromones_at(e, 
i*decay+incr+incr+incr)  
LP14 (Collecting of Food)  
"If an ant observes that it is at location F (the food source), then it will pick up some 
food."  
observes(a, is_at_location_from(F, e)) → to_be_performed(a, 
pick_up_food)  
LP15 (Carrying of Food)  
"If an ant picks up food, then as a result it will be carrying food."  
to_be_performed(a, pick_up_food) → is_carrying_food(a)  
LP16 (Dropping of Food)  
"If an ant is carrying food, and observes that it is at location A (the nest), then the ant 
will drop the food."  
observes(a, is_at_location_from(A, e)) and is_carrying_food(a) → 
to_be_performed(a, drop_food)  
LP17 (Persistence of Food)  
"As long as an ant that is carrying food does not drop the food, it will keep on carrying 
it."  
is_carrying_food(a) and not to_be_performed(a, drop_food) → 
is_carrying_food(a)  
LP18 (Decay of Pheromones)  
"If the old amount of pheromones at an edge is i, and there is no ant dropping any 
pheromones at this edge, then the new amount of pheromones at e will be i*decay."  
pheromones_at(e, i) and ∀a,l not to_be_performed(a, 
drop_pheromones_at_edge_from(e, l)) → pheromones_at(e, i*decay)  
Appendix B - The Single Agent Simulation Model  
LP1' (Initialisation of Beliefs)  
"At the start of the simulation, superant A beliefs that all locations have relevance 
level 0."  
start → belief(S, relevance_level(E1, 0.0)) and belief(S, 
relevance_level(E2, 0.0)) and belief(S, relevance_level(E3, 0.0)) and 
belief(S, relevance_level(E4, 0.0)) and belief(S, relevance_level(E5, 
0.0)) and belief(S, relevance_level(E6, 0.0)) and belief(S, 
relevance_level(E7, 0.0)) and belief(S, relevance_level(E8, 0.0)) and 
belief(S, relevance_level(E9, 0.0)) and belief(S, 
relevance_level(E10, 0.0))  
LP2' (Initialisation of Paws)  
"At the start of the simulation, S has all of its paws at location A."  
start → has_paw_at_location_from(S, paw1, A, init) and 
has_paw_at_location_from(S, paw2, A, init) and 
has_paw_at_location_from(S, paw3, A, init)  
LP3' (Initialisation of World)  
"These two properties model the ant world. The first property expresses which 
locations are connected to each other, and via which edges they are connected. The 
second property expresses for each location how many neighbours it has."  
start → connected_to_via(A, B, l1) and … and connected_to_via(D, H, 
l10) start → neighbours(A, 2) and … and neighbours(H, 3)  
LP4' (Initialisation of Attractive Directions)  
"This property expresses for each paw and each location, which edge is most attractive 
for the paw at if it arrives at that location. This criterion can be used in case a paw 
arrives at a location where there are two edges with an equal amount of pheromones."  
start → attractive_direction_at(paw1, A, E1) and … and 
attractive_direction_at(paw3, E, E5)  
LP5' (Selection of Edge)  
"These properties model the edge selection mechanism of superant S. For example, the 
first property expresses that, when S observes that it has a paw p at location A, and S 
beliefs that the relevance level of both edges connected to location A is equal, then S 
will move its paw to its attractive direction."  
observes(S, has_paw_at_location_from(p, A, e0)) and 
attractive_direction_at(p, A, e1) and connected_to_via(A, l1, e1) and 
belief(S, relevance_level(e1, i1)) and connected_to_via(A, l2, e2) 
and belief(S, relevance_level(e2, i2)) and e1 ≠ e2 and i1 = i2 → 
to_be_performed(S, move_paw_to_edge_from_to(p, e1, A, l1))  
observes(S, has_paw_at_location_from(p, A, e0)) and 
connected_to_via(A, l1, e1) and belief(S, relevance_level(e1, i1)) 
and connected_to_via(A, l2, e2) and belief(S, relevance_level(e2, 
i2)) and i1 > i2 → to_be_performed(S, move_paw_to_edge_from_to(p, e1, 
A, l1))  
observes(S, has_paw_at_location_from(p, F, e0)) and 
connected_to_via(F, l1, e1) and belief(S, relevance_level(e1, i1)) 
and connected_to_via(F, l2, e2) and belief(S, relevance_level(e2, 
i2)) and i1 > i2 → to_be_performed(S, move_paw_to_edge_from_to(p, e1, 
F, l1))  
observes(S, has_paw_at_location_from(p, l, e0)) and neighbours(l, 2) 
and connected_to_via(l, l1, e1) and e0 ≠ e1 and l ≠ A and l ≠ F → 
to_be_performed(S, move_paw_to_edge_from_to(p, e1, l, l1))  
observes(S, has_paw_at_location_from(p, l, e0)) and 
attractive_direction_at(a, l, e1) and neighbours(l, 3) and 
connected_to_via(l, l1, e1) and belief(S, relevance_level(e1, 0.0)) 
and connected_to_via(l, l2, e2) and belief(S, relevance_level(e2, 
0.0)) and e0 ≠ e1 and e0 ≠ e2 and e1 ≠ e2 → to_be_performed(S, 
move_paw_to_edge_from_to(p, e1, l, l1))  
observes(S, has_paw_at_location_from(p, l, e0)) and neighbours(l, 3) 
and connected_to_via(l, l1, e1) and belief(S, relevance_level(e1, 
i1)) and connected_to_via(l, l2, e2) and belief(S, 
relevance_level(e2, i2)) and e0 ≠ e1 and e0 ≠ e2 and e1 ≠ e2 and i1 > 
i2 → to_be_performed(S, move_paw_to_edge_from_to(p, e1, l1))  
LP6' (Paw Arrival at Edge)  
"If S moves its paw p to an edge e from a location l to a location l1, then later this paw 
will be at this edge e."  
to_be_performed(S, move_paw_to_edge_from_to(p, e, l, l1)) → 
has_paw_at_edge_from_to(S, p, e, l, l1)  
LP7' (Paw Observation at Edge)  
"If S has a paw at a certain edge e, going from a location l to a location l1, then it will 
observe this."  
has_paw_at_edge_from_to(S, p, e, l, l1) → observes(S, 
has_paw_at_edge_from_to(p, e, l, l1))  
LP8' (Paw Movement to Location)  
"If S observes that it has a paw p at an edge e from a location l to a location l1, then it 
will move this paw to location l1."  
observes(S, has_paw_at_edge_from_to(p, e, l, l1)) → 
to_be_performed(S, move_paw_to_location_from(p, l1, e))  
LP9' (Paw Arrival at Location)  
"If S moves its paw p to a location l from an edge e, then later this paw will be at this 
location l."  
to_be_performed(S, move_paw_to_location_from(p, l, e)) → 
has_paw_at_location_from(S, p, l, e)  
LP10' (Paw Observation at Location)  
"If S has a paw p at a certain location l, then it will observe this."  
has_paw_at_location_from(S, p, l, e) → observes(S, 
has_paw_at_location_from(p, l, e))  
LP11' (Increment of Belief)  
"These properties model the increment of S' belief of the relevance level of an edge as 
a result of the presence of its paws there. For example, the first property expresses 
that, if S has exactly one paw at edge e, then the new number of pheromones at e 
becomes i*decay+incr. Here, i is the old relevance level, decay is the decay factor, and 
incr is the increment value of the belief."  
observes(S, has_paw_at_edge_from_to(p1, e, l, l1)) and ∀l2 not 
observes(S, has_paw_at_edge_from_to(p2, e, l, l2)) and ∀l3 not 
observes(S, has_paw_at_edge_from_to(p3, e, l, l3)) and p1 ≠ p2 and p1 
≠ p3 and p2 ≠ p3 and belief(S, relevance_level(e, i)) → belief(S, 
relevance_level(e, i*decay+incr))  
observes(S, has_paw_at_edge_from_to(p1, e, l, l1)) and observes(S, 
has_paw_at_edge_from_to(p2, e, l, l2)) and ∀l3 not observes(S, 
has_paw_at_edge_from_to(p3, e, l, l3)) and p1 ≠ p2 and p1 ≠ p3 and p2 
≠ p3 and belief(S, relevance_level(e, i)) → belief(S, 
relevance_level(e, i*decay+incr+incr))  
observes(S, has_paw_at_edge_from_to(p1, e, l, l1)) and observes(S, 
has_paw_at_edge_from_to(p2, e, l, l2)) and observes(S, 
has_paw_at_edge_from_to(p3, e, l, l3)) and p1 ≠ p2 and p1 ≠ p3 and p2 
≠ p3 and belief(S, relevance_level(e, i)) → belief(S, 
relevance_level(e, i*decay+incr+incr+incr))  
LP12' (Collecting of Food)  
"If S observes that it has a paw p at location F (the food source), then it will pick up 
some food with that paw."  
observes(S, has_paw_at_location_from(p, F, e)) → to_be_performed(S, 
pick_up_food_with_paw(p))  
LP13' (Carrying of Food)  
"If S picks up food with a paw p, then as a result it will be carrying food with that 
paw."  
to_be_performed(S, pick_up_food_with_paw(p)) → 
is_carrying_food_with_paw(S, p)  
LP14' (Dropping of Food)  
"If S is carrying food with a paw p, and observes that this paw is at location A (the 
nest), then S will drop the food with that paw."  
observes(S, has_paw_at_location_from(p, A, e)) and 
is_carrying_food_with_paw(S, p) → to_be_performed(S, 
drop_food_with_paw(p))  
LP15' (Persistence of Food)  
"As long as a paw that is carrying food does not drop the food, it will keep on carrying 
it."  
is_carrying_food_with_paw(S, p) and not to_be_performed(S, 
drop_food_with_paw(p)) → is_carrying_food_with_paw(S, p)  
LP16' (Decay of Belief)  
"If S beliefs that the relevance level of an edge is i, and S does not observe any of its 
paws at this edge, then it will belief that the new relevance level of e is i*decay."  
belief(S, relevance_level(e, i)) and ∀p,l,l1 not observes(S, 
has_paw_at_edge_from_to(p, e, l, l1)) → belief(S, relevance_level(e, 
i*decay))  
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